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Abstract: While firms understand that implementing green supply chain management (GSCM) is
important, they seem uncertain about how to manage their green initiatives by looking beyond their
own facilities. Building a green supply chain requires the participation of all partner firms across the
supply chain. However, partner firms are different in size, situation, capabilities, and even industries.
Thus, encouraging them to participate in green initiatives is difficult. Many small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) hesitate to comply with green initiatives as they require a substantial amount
of investment. This study empirically examines the causal relationship between the partnership
governance mechanism and the success of GSCM. Based on transaction-cost economics theory (i.e.,
opportunism) and relational perspectives (i.e., trust) as the theoretical background, this study found
that governance mechanisms between suppliers and manufacturers are positively related to GSCM
performance. It showed that formal governance is important in the process-management side, while
relational governance is critical for sharing knowledge in GSCM. The implications of the study results
provide strategic insights on how the choice of governance mechanism affects GSCM performance
and thus a firm’s competitiveness.
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1. Introduction
Many countries around the globe have enacted environmental regulations to minimize
harmful output and operational processes. Thus, many businesses have joined the “green
movement”. This movement emphasizes the importance of green supply chain management (GSCM), which has brought a great deal of risk to those firms that fail to manage
their suppliers for green operations [1]. In today’s dynamic market environment, especially in the current COVID-19 pandemic crisis, collaboration between original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) and suppliers for developing and sustaining an effective supply
chain is imperative, as it is aimed at not just reducing costs through process innovation but
also becoming environmentally friendly to fulfill their social responsibilities [2–5].
A growing number of organizations realize that, to simultaneously achieve their environmental goals and competitiveness, they need to manage their supply chains with
green initiatives looking beyond their own facilities. For example, the Responsible Business
Alliance (RBA) has been introduced to encourage suppliers to participate in green supply
chain initiatives [6]. The firms participating in this initiative include such global firms as
Apple, Cisco, Dell, Hitachi, Intel, Microsoft, Sony, and Xerox. This program requires suppliers to define and deploy environmental management systems, measure the environmental
impact of their operations, establish goals to improve their green performance, publicly
disclose their metrics and results, and “cascade” these requirements to their own suppliers.
To participate in green supply chain management, suppliers need to invest in environmentally friendly equipment, processes, and human resources training. Suppliers, typically
small- and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs), face much greater risk than their large buyer
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organizations when they are asked to invest in environmentally friendly systems [7]. The
exchange hazards embedded in transaction-specific investments could be better managed
if the right governance mechanisms are in place. Transaction-specific investments are those
specialized to the OEM–supplier relationship. For example, a supplier might invest in
specialized processes or equipment to produce customized or required components for
an OEM that requests green process engineering. However, green transaction-specific
investments can be costly for suppliers, because such investments do not create value in
their other relationships. If an OEM decides to terminate the partnership, a supplier could
have difficulty recouping the loss of its investments. Thus, suppliers might hesitate to
invest in green systems.
Previous studies have indicated how firms engage in green supply chains and how
this can increase profit [8–11]. However, there is a paucity of empirical studies that address
the question of how OEMs can motivate their suppliers (e.g., SMEs) to implement GSCM
systems under the right supply chain governance mechanism [12,13]. In addition, studies
have analyzed the governance mechanism as control between buyers and suppliers for
achieving a competitive advantage. However, not all collaboration efforts would result in
successful outcomes, since different supply chain governance mechanisms deliver different
signals to partners, because a possible mismatch between the supply chain governance
mechanism implemented and the purpose relationship can harm the performance of green
supply chain management.
The primary focus of this study is to investigate the following research questions:
(1) How can choices between the formal transactional mechanism and the relational mechanism mitigate the risk of investing in green systems for the partners? (2) What is the impact
of the chosen governance mechanism on organizational performance for the partners?
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a literature review and the
hypotheses development. Section 3 discusses the method employed for the study, including
data-collection and research methodology. In Section 4, we discuss the results of the study.
Section 5 concludes the study with a summary, the theoretical and practical implications of
the study results, the limitations of the study results, and the future research needs.
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
2.1. Exchange Hazard and Transactional Governance
Transaction cost economics (TCE) posits that the costs associated with various interorganizational relationships embody the critical factor of determining the governance form.
Partner organizations are assumed to have the potential to behave with opportunism [14].
According to TCE, credible economic commitments are necessary to sustain the interorganizational relationship. The high level of uncertainty in the relationship with a large
buyer may cause suppliers to hesitate to invest in GSCM, because they would want an
appropriate safeguard to protect them from risk [15]. The financial economic commitment
by a supplier creates a locked-in relationship, which in turn promotes behaviors that ensure
the continuance of the partnership [16]. Economic constraints such as the investment of
specific assets tend to reduce the potential for opportunism by locking partners into an
OEMs–suppliers relationship, as the expected long-term return of the relationship exceeds
the potential short-term return of opportunism [17]. Thus, OEMs and suppliers may choose
to have a comprehensive contract, a vertically integrated structure, or an arm’s-length
relationship when exchange hazards exist.
With more specified and formalized contracts, the hazard that each firm might experience would be minimized [18]. Furthermore, since the OEM firm may not be certain
which partner will be opportunistic, the transaction cost for monitoring, modifying, and
enforcing the terms of the contract would increase. In case of a high level of exchange
hazard, an OEM firm would use a hierarchy structure with contracts that enable the firm to
have tighter control over specific investments. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
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Hypothesis 1 (H1). Exchange hazard is positively related to the need for a transactional governance mechanism.
2.2. Trust and Relational Governance
Trust has been considered as a factor that affects positive performance within the
interorganizational relationship. In this vein, studies have suggested that justice can
increase the acceptance of vulnerability because it signals how decision making will proceed
over the long term [19].
Studies also support the notion that social-exchange relationships are based on trusting
that other parties to the exchanges will fairly discharge their obligations in the long run [20].
High transaction costs and agency costs result when there is a low level of trust between
partners, while studies observed low costs when a high level of trust was embedded
between partners. An OEM–supplier relationship with high trust would allow the partners
to communicate openly and the firms would be willing to take risks, because they would
not be afraid to share information and would believe in the content of the information
received. Thus, the following hypothesis is suggested:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Trust is positively related to the development of a relational governance mechanism.
2.3. Governance Mechanism and GSCM
Studies have shown that a supply chain governance mechanism influences the relationship performance. The governance mechanism defines the specific processes or
motivation that suppliers deploy to pursue the shared objective. This mitigates uncertainty between OEMs and suppliers in two different ways. The transactional governance
mechanism provides guidelines that suppliers and OEMs should follow [21]. Based on a
legal and institutional framework, the interorganizational relationship is controlled and
monitored by partners. Green process management is the system that is institutionalized
for internal environmental-management practices, and this enables the firm to meet the
basic requirements for GSCM. Thus, the green process can be demonstrated to OEMs
without relinquishing control of the asset. The pre-agreement disclosure characteristics of
the green process make it easier for the firm to negotiate a mutually acceptable contract
and specify the performance criteria that will form the basis of a formal mechanism [22].
Furthermore, unlike in knowledge-based collaboration, the firm can easily alter the
specification of the green process with a contract. Since the green process is a standardized
process (e.g., ISO 14001), it does not require partners to understand the terms that cannot
be codified. Studies have found that the transactional mechanism is more effective at reducing opportunistic behavior and maintaining its agreements (e.g., the green process) [23].
Therefore, the transactional governance mechanism is a more cost-effective way to manage
the property-based assets. Thus, the following hypothesis is presented:
Hypothesis 3a (H3a). Transactional governance is positively related to the green process.
Knowledge sharing or transfer, a necessary condition for green innovation, is difficult
to coordinate across firms because it needs to be embedded in the routines of the firm and
is hard to specify by a contract [24,25]. In addition, it is impossible to include the intricacies
of tacit-knowledge transfer in a contract, because tacit knowledge cannot be measured for
its value or price [26].
However, few studies have investigated a formal contract as the governing mechanism
to facilitate knowledge transfer. Formal contracts specify the obligations of both firms in
the relationship to clarify the duties or tasks of each firm. They mitigate the uncertainty
of returns from participating projects. Furthermore, when they play the role of a control
tool, contracts may motivate participating firms to share explicit knowledge [27]. Thus,
contracts may need to be specific and complete to create formal operating procedures that
require the communication of explicit knowledge. The following hypothesis is proposed to
explore this relationship:
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Hypothesis 3b (H3b). Transactional governance is positively related to green innovation.
Relational governance influences the behavior of a firm and its performance [28,29].
Relational governance motivates the participating firms to be involved in the relationship
to a greater extent than is necessary. Social exchange theory posits that trust is the factor
that makes relational governance possible, allowing greater benefits of knowledge transfer,
joint learning, and the sharing of risks and costs associated with exploring and exploiting
opportunities [30].
Previous studies have found that collaboration between suppliers and OEMs enables
the participating firms to leverage the resources and knowledge of their partners and
customers by mitigating the ‘fear that one’s exchange partner will act opportunistically’ [31].
When a firm believes that its partner will act in good faith and shirking will not occur,
the firm tends to share its tacit knowledge more readily. Previous studies found that
interorganizational relationships with trust positively affect innovativeness and supply
chain performance [32–34]. These studies defined the core competency as the collective
learning capability of the organization by coordinating production skills and integrating
the dynamics of environmental changes. This mechanism facilitates participation in the
green innovative process by restricting the opportunistic behavior. Thus, the following
hypothesis is developed:
Hypothesis 4a (H4a). Relational governance is positively related to green innovation.
An interorganizational relationship that is based on trust not only facilitates knowledge transfer with interorganizational routines, but it also enables OEMs and suppliers to
make mutual adjustments without having frequent renegotiations for contract changes [35].
This relationship with flexibility helps OEMs and suppliers have synchronized information on the status of the green process, so that they can resolve problems with agility.
Studies have found that relational governance is more effective for seizing new opportunities, because the process is flexible, frequent, cooperative, mutually beneficial, and
comprehensive [36]. Social exchange theory (SET) posits that two characteristics of the
interorganizational context help us to understand the flexibility of the relationships between the firms. The first characteristic, which is trust, may influence the willingness of the
partners to adapt to changing environmental demands through modifications. Secondly,
the partners’ dependence on the OEM–supplier relationship may have a positive impact
on the longevity of the relationship by implementing what is demanded from the partners
(e.g., the green process) [37]. The following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 4b (H4b). Relational governance is positively related to the green process.
2.4. Green Supply Chain Management and Performance
Studies have found GSCM is positively related to financial profit and environmental
performance [38–43]. A win–win argument suggests that the benefits of environmental
management are larger than the costs and tighter regulatory standards will lead to superior
performance [44]. Furthermore, participating in international standards such as ISO 14001
will positively affect organizational performance [45]. Studies have also argued that success
in addressing environmental issues may help firms to reduce risk and, in turn, increase
innovation and profitability [26,46].
The elimination of waste and the reduction of air emissions are noted as means to lowering costs. In addition, public announcements about a firm’s green management practices
positively affect its image as a socially responsible firm and its financial performance [47].
Green innovation has been proposed as a factor that positively influences organizational
performance [48,49]. Thus, the following hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 5a (H5a). Successful implementation of the green process is positively related to the
firm’s financial performance.
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Questionnaires were distributed mainly to supply chain managers of 1090 manufacturing companies. The list of sample firms and their supply chain managers were obtained
from the Korean Logistic Association and the Korea Auto Industries Coop Association
database. Another list of firms was obtained from a large original equipment manufacturer
(OEM) in Korea. To increase the response rate, this study followed a strategy suggested by
Dillman [52]. Initial e-mailing was followed by reminder e-mails after two weeks. Out of
1090 emails, 240 had incorrect information and the emails were returned with the deliveryerror message. The survey yielded 202 usable responses (a response rate of 23.76%), which
is an acceptable rate for an SCM survey [53]. Table 1 shows the sample characteristics in
terms of the industry type and size of the participating organizations.
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Table 1. Sample characteristics.
Industry Type

Frequency

Percent

Automobile hardware and manufacturing

54

26.7

Industrial, commercial machinery and computer
equipment

41

20.3

Metal manufacturing

31

15.3

Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products

29

14.4

Electronic/other electrical equipment and
components, except computers

23

11.4

Logistics

5

2.5

Miscellaneous manufacturing industries

2

1.0

Total

202

100.0

Number of Employees

Frequency

Percent

Up to 50

2

1.0

51–100

10

5.0

101–150

51

29.2

151–200

30

14.9

201–250

59

29.2

251–300

37

18.3

Over 300

13

6.4

Total

202

100.0

4. Results
4.1. Measurement Model
Structural equation modeling (SEM) with AMOS 26.0 was used to test and analyze
the hypothesized relationships in the research model. The main reason that SEM is widely
employed in many scientific fields is that it can explicitly take into account measurement
errors in the observed variables (both dependent and independent) [54,55]. In this study,
we analyzed the collected data to establish dimensional structures. First, the content
validity was tested to assure that the measures used adequately represented all facets of the
concepts. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted to establish the convergent
and discriminant validity. The overall model fit was assessed using the indices of various
fit criteria (RMSEA = 0.078; CFI = 0.909; CMIN/DF = 2.233) [56–61].
The convergent validity was assessed by the item factor loadings and the squared multiple correlation coefficients of the items. Convergent validity is the degree to which scores
on a test correlate with scores on other tests designed for assessing the same construct [62].
Fornell and Larcker [63] suggested that convergent validity exists when the item factor
loadings are greater than 0.7 and items’ squared multiple correlation coefficients are greater
than 0.5 (See Table 2). RG 2 and GP 5 were dropped due to their small loadings.
To assess the reliability of the constructs, composite reliability (CR) was used. Reliability refers to the relative absence of measurement errors, regardless of the time, form,
questionnaire items, researcher, and subject group of the study. It also represents the extent
to which a test or other instrument is consistent in its measures. Both the AVE and CR
values exceeded the recommended thresholds of 0.5 and 0.6, respectively [64].
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Table 2. Construct and reliability.
Construct

Items

Standardized Loading

Standardized Error

Composite Reliability 1

AVE 2

Transactional
governance

TG1
TG2
TG3
TG4

0.733
0.783
0.772
0.803

0.269
0.238
0.261
0.224

0.905

0.706

0.864

Relational
governance

RG1
RG2
RG3
RG4
RG5
RG6

0.875
0.931
0.938
0.905

0.301
0.180
0.141
0.242

0.946

0.779

Trust

TS1
TS2
TS3
TS4
TS5
TS6

0.89
0.891
0.893
0.906
0.936
0.852

0.278
0.257
0.301
0.218
0.186
0.346

0.947

0.751

Exchange
hazard

EH 1
EH 2
EH 3
EH 4

0.794
0.803
0.876
0.899

0.265
0.336
0.240
0.164

0.918

0.739

Green product
innovation

GI 1
GI 2
GI 3
GI 4
GI 5

0.874
0.884
0.882
0.851
0.847

0.212
0.290
0.290
0.354
0.285

0.929

0.724

Green process

GP 1
GP 2
GP 3
GP 4
GP 5

0.691
0.865
0.854
0.753

0.225
0.172
0.187
0.278

0.920

0.745

Environmental
performance

Evnp1
Envp2
Envp3
Envp4
Envp5

0.816
0.824
0.908
0.812
0.800

0.229
0.274
0.128
0.241
0.241

0.939

0.757

Financial
performance

Finp 1
Finp2
Finp 3
Finp 4

0.864
0.924
0.937
0.852

0.287
0.156
0.157
0.299

0.934

0.780

1
2

0.289
Deleted

Deleted

CR (composite reliability) = (∑(factor loading))2 / ((∑(factor loading))2 + ∑(error))
AVE = ∑(factor loading)2 / (∑(factor loading)2 + ∑(error)).

The discriminant validity was assessed by comparing the average variance extracted
(AVE) with the squared correlation between the constructs [63]. Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients between the latent variables, and the AVE of each construct is shown on the
diagonal. Fornell and Larcker [65] stated that the squared correlation between constructs
must be less than the AVE of each underlying construct in order for the constructs to
have discriminant validity. In this study, every squared correlation between the constructs
was greater than the AVE of the constructs. Thus, discriminant validity was assured (see
Table 3).
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlations matrix.

Transactional
governance (1)
Relational
governance (2)
Trust (3)
Exchange hazard (4)
Green innovation (5)
Green process (6)
Environmental
performance (7)
Financial
performance (8)

21, 132, 13146

21, 132, 13146

21, 132, 13146

21, 132, 13146

21, 132, 13146

21, 132, 13146

21, 132, 13146

21, 132, 13146

21, 132, 13146

21, 132, 13146

Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

4.887

0.663

0.707

4.272

1.033

−0.141 *

0.780

4.336
5.011
4.675
5.355

1.054
0.837
0.973
0.658

−0.189 *
0.651 **
−0.150 *
0.180 *

5.385

0.745

4.677

0.984

6

7

8

0.712 **
−0.090
0.562 **
0.247 **

0.751
−0.038
0.579 **
0.097

0.739
−0.141 *
0.085

0.725
0.160 *

0.745

0.019

0.367 **

0.201 **

−0.010

0.341 **

0.612 **

0.757

0.222 **

0.452 **

0.311 **

−0.030

0.456 **

0.419 **

0.477 **

0.781

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.

4.2. StrucModel Analysis and Results
The results of the hypotheses tests and the significance of the links are summarized
in Table 3. The firm size was controlled, as it could affect the relationships between the
antecedent (i.e., trust and exchange hazard) and supply chain governance, between supply
chain governance and GSCM (i.e., green process and green innovation), and between GSCM
and the organizational performance. As shown in Table 4, after controlling for firm size,
the effect of the exchange hazard on transactional governance was significant and positive
(γ = 0.691, p < 0.01). The result provided strong support for Hypothesis 1. Thus, when
a firm experienced an exchange hazard in a relationship, the 9suppliers
and OEMs were
of 16
more likely to have transactional governance with a more specified contract to regulate
the relationship. In the situation where a firm trusted its partner,
9 of the
16 interorganizational
relationship would be governed by the relational mechanism (r = 0.641, p < 0.01). This
performance (γ = 0.481, p < 0.01) and to environmental performance (γ = 0.171, p < 0.05)
9 of 16
implied that trust between partners mitigates the risk of disruption
of the relationship [66]
were significant, supporting both Hypotheses 6a and 6b.
and
this
result
supported
Hypothesis
2.
performance (γ = 0.481, p < 0.01) and to environmental performance (γ = 0.171, p < 0.05)
9 of 16

were significant,
both Hypotheses 6a and 6b.
Table
4. Summary supporting
of hypotheses.
Table
4. Summary of hypotheses.
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9 of 16
Direct
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and
6b.
Table
4.
Summary
of
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Hypothesis
Path

Direct Effects
Effects
Value
Testing
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(γTrust
= 0.481,
p < 0.01) and to environmental
(γ = 0.171,
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governance performance
governance
9 of 16
governance
Direct
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supporting
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Hypotheses
6a
and
6b.
Table
4.
Summary
of
hypotheses.
Transactional
Transactional
Hypothesis
Path
Relational
0.691
**
0.001
Supported
H1
Exchange
H3a
Green processperformance
0.238
**
Transactional
Effects
Testing
0.641
**
0.001
Supported
H2
Trusthazard
performance
(γ
= 0.481,
p < 0.01) and to environmental
(γ = 0.171,
p <0.003
0.05)
governance
governance
H3a
Green
process
0.238
** Value
0.003
Supported
9 of 16
governance
Direct
pHypotheses
governance
were
significant,
supporting
both
Hypotheses
6a
and
6b.
Table
4.
Summary
of
hypotheses.
Transactional
Transactional
Hypothesis
Path
Relational
0.691
0.001
Supported
H1
Exchange
H3b
Green innovation
−**
Transactional
Effects
Value
Testing
0.641
**0.054
0.001
Supported
H2
Trusthazard
performance
(γ
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Not
governance
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Direct
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governance
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Hypotheses
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Table
4.
Summary
of
hypotheses.
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The transactional governance mechanism exhibited a high level of green process
(r = 0.238, p < 0.01), while it did not affect green innovation (r = −0.54, p > 0.05). Thus,
Hypothesis 3a was supported but Hypothesis 3b was not. The relational governance mechanism significantly affected both green process (r = 0.315, p < 0.01) and green innovation
(r = 0.424, p < 0.01). The paths from green process to environmental performance (γ = 0.481,
p < 0.01) and to financial performance (γ = 0.379, p < 0.01) were significant. Therefore,
Hypotheses 5a and 5b were also supported. The paths from green innovation to financial
performance (γ = 0.481, p < 0.01) and to environmental performance (γ = 0.171, p < 0.05)
were significant, supporting both Hypotheses 6a and 6b.
4.3. Discussion of Hypotheses Testing Results
The SEM analysis supported the positive impact of exchange hazard on the transactional governance (r = 0.691) mechanism and of trust on the relational governance
mechanism (r = 641). This implied that interorganizational transaction experiences (i.e.,
exchange hazard and trust) decide the forms or structures of the interorganizational relationship [67]. These results were consistent with previous findings. Mesquita and
Brush [68] argued that to reduce the hazard in OEMs–suppliers relationships, transactional
governance mechanisms can be implemented as safeguards or as a coordination device.
The literature has identified that the trust of the supplier, relational capital, and commitment exert significant effects on the structure of the relationship [20,69]. When partner
firms trust each other, their willingness to maintain a long-term relationship constitutes the
relational governance mechanism.
An interesting finding from this study was that different governance mechanisms
have different impacts on GSCM. In this study, GSCM was measured by two different
constructs, the green process and green innovation. The green process, which is a function
or system of green operations, does not require extensive knowledge exchange [70]. Thus,
both governance mechanisms affected the green process positively. While both governance
mechanisms affected the green process significantly, relational governance had a stronger
relationship (r = 0.315) with the green process as compared to the transactional governance
mechanism (r = 0.238). In addition, green innovation was affected by relational governance
(r = 0.424) but not by transactional governance (r = −0.54). These results were consistent
with those of previous studies [36]. Previous studies have argued that relational mechanisms have positive impacts on knowledge creation [71]. To increase the capability for
innovating green-related products, knowledge exchange or building knowledge-sharing
routines between organizations is necessary [72]. Panayides & Venus Lun [73] maintained
that trust between firms facilitates innovation from the OEMs–suppliers relationship. The
transactional governance mechanism is not effective in encouraging partners to get involved in knowledge-creation projects. Since transactional governance is derived from
the exchange hazard, participating firms may hesitate to provide their capabilities that
are not listed on the contract. However, when firms trust each other and operate under
a sound relational mechanism, they are willing to share even the knowledge that is not
specified on the contract. Consistent with the literature, the green process was affected
by two governance mechanisms. Since the green process is like an asset-based resource
or infrastructure of a firm, it can be easily monitored using the transactional governance
mechanism [74]. Furthermore, as has been suggested by previous studies [75], the relational
governance mechanism motivates partners to participate in the project or strategy initiated
by OEMs.
Two GSCM constructs, green process and green innovation, positively affect organizational performance. It has been argued that GSCM positively affects organizational
performance [76]. However, the results of this study indicated there are different relationship strengths depending on the type of GSCM. Since the green process is a function
or system that has an immediate impact on green performance, the green process has
a stronger relationship with environmental performance (r = −0.481) than with green
innovation (r = 0.171). On the other hand, green innovation, which is more of a value-
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creating activity, has a greater impact on financial performance (r = 0.481) than on the green
process (r = 0.379). Thus, this study found that green innovation is effective in improving
financial performance, while the green process was identified as a practical strategy for
improving environmental performance. Since there has been no study that has included
both green innovation and the green process, it is not easy to compare the results of our
study with the literature. However, these results can be explained based on the results
reported by Zhu and Sarkis [77]. Their study found that eco-design is more positively
related to financial performance than to internal or external environmental practices, and
internal and external environmental practices are more positively related to environmental
performance than eco-design is to environmental performance. Since eco-design refers to
managing suppliers’ control of the design process for products, it is comparable to green
innovation. Furthermore, internal and external environmental practices can be equivalent
to the green process in this study, because their measurements are similar.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
In today’s digital era, corporate environmental strategies have moved beyond reactive
approaches to focusing on internal functions. Now, firms take more proactive approaches
to engaging with business partners (i.e., suppliers). However, most previous GSCM related
studies have not investigated which governance mechanisms of the inter-organizational
relationship can lead to successful GSCM. This study focused on two GSCM practices,
green innovation and the green process, and proposed two governance mechanisms,
transactional and relational, for successful GSCM implementation, which in turn positively
affect organizational performance.
This study found evidence that the right choice of governance mechanism in the
OEM–supplier relationship depends on the status of their relationship and considered the
exchange hazard, the level of potential opportunism, as an antecedent that leads firms
to formal contract-based relationships. The results of this study supported the notion
that transactional governance encourages suppliers to be involved in GSCM initiated by
OEMs. Particularly, the green process, which is one of systems that suppliers need to
implement to fulfill the GSCM strategy, is positively related to the transactional governance
mechanism. Since green processes can be measured directly by the partners with the
transactional governance mechanism, each partner firm can monitor or manage the quality
or status of the green process by regulating the internal green management practice with
their partners based on a contract. However, the transactional governance mechanism does
not positively affect green innovation. Unlike the green process, green innovation requires
knowledge exchange between partners. Knowledge exchange, especially of the tacit
type, cannot be stipulated by contracts or documents. Thus, the transactional governance
mechanism can limit the willingness to be involved in the innovation process beyond
what is documented in the contract. This empirical result contributes to the literature by
confirming that a specific contract with the supplier can hamper the autonomy of suppliers’
innovative capability.
Consistent with the literature on relational governance, this study found that trust is
imperative to maintain a relational governance mechanism. The findings from this study
supported the major notion of social exchange theory that concerns how transactions in an
interorganizational relationship evolve and change over time. As social exchange theory
argues, the willingness to accept vulnerability is the cornerstone of the theory. The results
of this study showed that trust is a key factor to motivate partners to be involved in the
GSCM strategy. Such a committed relationship, based upon mutual trust, usually develops
over time. Firms can develop, test, observe, and confirm the existence of trust. According
to social exchange theory, partners are willing to participate in the relationship beyond
what is necessary according to the contract [78].
Green innovation is increasingly viewed as a key to sustainable product development.
Since supply chain partners are highly interdependent, a firm should share information
with their partners to successfully manage product development processes. Thus, when
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there is no or limited information exchange between partners in the supply chain, a GSCM
project can hardly avoid failure. The environmental impacts of products are usually
determined when the raw materials are selected. Managing the suppliers during the
early design phase is an essential part of designing environmentally friendly products. In
fact, the relational governance mechanism has been recognized as a major collaboration
structure in product innovation [79]. Using a collaborative product design, firms can
participate in global supply chains and work closely with various partners. Thus, firms
can obtain valuable inputs for their product design. Furthermore, firms can track and
manage their eco-friendly goods through collaborative relationships. This finding supports
previous studies that have argued that new product development can be invigorated by
building a close relationship between OEMs and suppliers [80].
The importance of relational governance is also evident in the green process. The
green process includes ISO 14001 certification, pollution prevention, recycling of materials,
waste reduction, and workplace health and safety. With the ever-increasing environmental
concerns and strict regulations, firms strive to manage these activities in a more costeffective and timely manner. According to Gavronski et al. [70], the green process represents
the capability that enables the firm to successfully implement GSCM.
This study found that GSCM improves organizational performance, which is measured in both financial and environmental terms. This study provides compelling evidence
that collaboration between supply chain partners through an effective governance mechanism is necessary to implement successful GSCM.
Overall, this study contributes to the growing body of research on the business value
of green strategies by highlighting the role of the supply chain governance mechanism.
As discussed earlier, previous studies that examined the effects of GSCM practices have
underscored the need for an effective governance mechanism for GSCM. Some studies
have argued for the importance of collaboration with external partners. However, there
is a paucity of research on the type of collaboration for GSCM that is best suited to a
given relationship status. The findings of this study suggest that mangers should carefully
assess the particulars of their current relationship and try to develop trust with partners,
because a firm can only successfully implement green innovation through a relational governance mechanism. However, the transactional governance mechanism also contributes
to organizational performance by improving the green process more effectively than the
relational governance mechanism. Thus, managers should understand the importance of
implementing the right governance mechanism for a given situation.
6. Limitations and Future Research Directions
This study investigated the role of the supply chain governance mechanism for suppliers to successfully implement GSCM. While this paper’s results make new contributions
to the GSCM literature, there were several limitations to the study. Firstly, since this study
was based on cross-sectional data, it was impossible to understand the effect of the time lag
between the constructs. As discussed earlier, if the relationship between green innovation
and organizational performance can be analyzed while considering the time lag, it might
yield interesting new insights.
Secondly, the relationship between two governance mechanisms was not studied in
this paper. Firms may start a relationship with a transactional governance mechanism and
gradually develop to relational governance later [81]. Ness and Haugland [82] examined
the evolution of relational governance and transactional governance in interorganizational
relationships. They argued that some firms could begin a relationship with transactional
governance and later develop it into a relational governance mechanism. Additionally, just
like ambidextrous capability, by employing the transactional governance mechanism and
relational mechanism at the same time, a firm might be able to focus not only on its current
competitive advantage, but also on its long-term competitiveness.
Finally, due to the relatively small sample size, some of the fit indices were not as good
as would be desired. A larger sample size would have increased the statistical power and
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given better results. Furthermore, since data were collected from a single source, common
methods bias could be a problem. For this study, financial performance was measured
based on the respondents’ self-perception, not by actual financial data. The respondents’
self-perception had potential exaggerating effects. The limitations of the study discussed
here provide future research opportunities in the fertile field of GSCM.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Literature review.
Construct

Transactional
mechanism

Relational
mechanism

Trust

Exchange hazard

Measurement
We have formal agreements that detail the obligations and rights of
both parties
The buyer rarely works with us on the SCC implementation.
If we struggle in the SCC, the buyer would simply switch to other
suppliers rather than work out a solution with us.
We have specific, well-designed agreements with buyer
The buyer allows open, two-way dialogue on the SCC issues, so that
the SCC targets can be established jointly.
The buyer works with us closely to implement the SCC (e.g., visiting
our production facilities, providing ongoing training programs, etc.).
If we comply with the SCC, we would get incentives from the buyer
(e.g., extending or renewing contracts, increasing order volumes,
financial rewards, etc.).
If we struggle in the SCC, the buyer would work out a solution with
us rather than simply switch to other suppliers.
The buyer has invested resources in enabling our capacity.
The buyer and us view each other as partners and share information
very well.
We believe in the partner because it is sincere.
The partner and our firm have a high level of mutual trust.
The partner is well known for fair dealing.
The partner stands by its word.
The partner has always been evenhanded in his or her negotiations
with us.
When making important decisions, the partner is concerned about
our welfare or interests.
We have made substantial investments in personnel dedicated
to partners
We have made substantial investments in capital equipment and
technology dedicated to partners.
This partner sometimes lies about certain things in order to protect
its interests.
This partner often fails to deliver promises, as described in
the contract.

Code

Literature

TG 1
TG 2

[20]

TG 3
TG 4
RG 1
RG 2

[83,84]

RG 3
RG 4
RG 5
RG 6
TS 1
TS 2
TS 3
TS 4

[20,84]

TS 5
TS 6
Eh 1
Eh 2
Eh 3
Eh 4

[84,85]
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Table A1. Cont.
Construct

Green product
innovation

Measurement
Our firm and supply chain partners jointly search and acquire new
and relevant knowledge that is related to green products
Our firm and supply chain partners jointly assimilate and apply
relevant knowledge for green products
Environmental information was shared and exchanged with key
component/material suppliers
We design our products to avoid or reduce the use of hazardous
products and their manufacturing process
Key suppliers were involved in design process to integrate
green issue

Code

Literature

GI 1
GI 2

[77,86]

GI 3
GI 4
GI 5

Green process

ISO 14001 certification
Pollution prevention.
Recycling of materials.
Waste reduction.
Workplace health and safety.

GP 1
GP 2
GP 3
GP 4
GP 5

[70]

Financial
performance

Our profitability has increased.
Our market share has increased.
Our sale growth rate has increased.
Our earning per share has increased.

Finp 1
Finp 2
Finp 3
Finp 4

[77]

Our air emission has been reduced.
Our waste water has been reduced.
Our solid waste has been reduced.
Our energy consumption has been reduced.
Our resources consumed for manufacturing practices has
been reduced.

Envp 1
Envp 2
Envp 3
Envp 4

Environmental
performance

[77]

Envp 5
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